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1. Introduction 
For many decades, the internationalization of firms’ operations has been a widely 
researched phenomenon in both developed and developing countries. Internationalization 
encompasses a wide variety of activities including exporting, foreign direct investment, 
global outsourcing and licensing. Recently, there has been a rapid growth in the 
internationalization of firms in transition economies such as China, India, Russia and East 
European countries. Exporting has been the dominant mode of foreign market 
participation, and a number of firm-level studies provide evidence that participation in 
export markets improves firms’ economic performance, financial health and long-run 
survival prospects (Greenaway et al., 2007; Park et al., 2010).  
Encouraging the internationalization of domestic firms has been a prominent policy 
choice in many countries, especially developing and transition economies (Buck et al., 
2000). This has been done particularly via exports, following the example of the export-led 
growth achievement of the Asian tigers such as Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan 
(World Bank, 1993)
1
. Participation in export markets is often viewed as helpful for 
economic growth, especially in emerging economies, as evidenced by a large number of 
cross-country studies at the aggregate level, which report a positive relationship between 
international trade and economic growth (Frankel and Romer, 1999). The desire to 
promote international sales is not limited to transition and emerging economies. Bernard 
and Jensen (2004) note that all fifty U.S states have offices to assist firms’ overseas sales, 
and document a considerable rise in the resources committed to export promotion in the 
US.  
Considering that expansion to international markets offers many advantages to 
firms, one can ask why not all firms engage in international trade. One possible reason is 
that venturing into international markets for the first time involves large initial fixed and 
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sunk start-up costs, and a considerable risk and uncertainty (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; 
Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Caggese and Cuñat, 2013). Recent developments in 
international trade theory have used a combination of these fixed and once-and-for-all 
start-up costs and heterogeneity in productivity to explain variations in firms’ export 
market participation decisions (Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz, 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 
2004)
2
. In a similar vein, following the pioneering empirical work of Greenaway et al. 
(2007), a number of recent papers study how financial factors influence exporting 
decisions (Berman and Héricout, 2010; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Caggese and Cuñat, 2013).  
Yet, the trade literature has largely neglected the effects of managerial incentives 
and other corporate governance mechanisms, which have been shown to significantly 
affect other aspects of firm behavior in the corporate finance literature. A large body of 
theoretical and empirical studies investigate the effects of managerial incentives and 
governance mechanisms on firm performance and various types of corporate decisions 
including investment in physical assets and research and development (R&D). For 
example, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) interest-alignment hypothesis suggests that 
managerial ownership aligns the incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders 
and provides top management with incentives to undertake risky investments and make 
decisions in the best interest of shareholders
3
. A counter-argument is proposed by Amihud 
and Lev (1981) and May (1995) who show that when managers’ shareholding is 
sufficiently large, they become entrenched, and tend to adopt investment and financing 
policy choices which reduce firms’ idiosyncratic risk at the expense of shareholders’ 
interests. In addition to managerial incentives, other corporate governance related variables 
such as state or foreign ownership, or board structure have been shown to significantly 
affect firm performance (see Brown et al., 2011, for a survey). 
In this paper, we connect the international trade literature on the determinants of 
firms’ exporting activities, with the corporate finance literature which has shown the 
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importance of managerial ownership and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
behavior. The primary governance attribute we consider is managerial ownership. 
Additionally, we examine the effects of other forms of corporate ownership such as state, 
legal person, and foreign shareholding, as well as the characteristics of the board of 
directors on firms’ internationalization decisions. We build on existing literature 
(Filatotchev et al., 2001 and 2007; Lu et al., 2009; Fu et al., 2010), which has typically 
analyzed the effects of a single or few specific corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
exporting behavior, by considering the simultaneous effect of several mechanisms. This 
approach mitigates omitted-variable bias and enables us to control for possible interactions 
between mechanisms. Our analysis focuses on both export propensity and intensity, which 
in our view, gives readers a thorough overview of the extent to which managerial 
ownership and other corporate governance variables affect firms’ overall export strategy 
Our study is based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 2004-
2010, which we differentiate into state- and privately-controlled. We believe that China 
represents an interesting case study for the analysis of the links between corporate 
exporting decisions and corporate governance mechanisms for the following two reasons. 
First, its accession to the WTO in late 2001 opened up tremendous business opportunities 
for Chinese firms worldwide. A large number of Chinese firms have consequently 
internationalized their operations, and the country has now become the first exporter in the 
world. Second, China’s corporate governance has been evolving and improving rapidly so 
as to cope with its fast economic growth and the desire to integrate with the global 
economy. For instance, after June 2003, companies were required to appoint one third of 
independent directors to their boards. In addition, following the 2005-2006 split-share 
structure reform, agency problems were significantly reduced, and restrictions on 
managerial stock ownership were removed (Li et al., 2011; Conyon and He, 2011). To the 
best of our knowledge, ours is the first study looking at the links between corporate 
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governance and firm exporting decisions in China, focusing on the differences between the 
pre- and post-reform period. Additionally, we are also the first to investigate differences in 
these links between state-controlled and privately-controlled firms, 
Using a dynamic modelling framework to control for the persistence in exporting 
(due to sunk costs), and controlling for firm heterogeneity and endogeneity, we document a 
strong non-monotonic relationship between managerial shareholding and export propensity 
and intensity. This implies that as managerial ownership increases, managers are provided 
with the incentive to align their interest with that of shareholders, which reduces agency 
costs and contributes towards shareholder-value maximization. Yet, after a threshold level 
is reached, managers become risk adverse and entrenchment effects become prominent, 
affecting firms’ behavior in a manner that is not conducive for international expansion. In 
addition, we find a negative association between state ownership and export intensity. 
Finally, we observe that the larger the board size, the lower the firm’s export propensity 
and intensity, and that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors in the board 
are generally less likely to export. These findings are mainly driven by privately-controlled 
firms during the post-2006 period and suggest that in the Chinese context, in order to 
promote the international presence of Chinese firms, company shares should be included in 
the compensation package of managers, state ownership should be further reduced, and 
firms should be encouraged to have smaller boards and to pay particular attention to the 
quality of the independent directors in their boards. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a description of 
the institutional environment in China. In Section 3, we present some theoretical 
background on the links between managerial ownership and other corporate governance 
variables, on the one hand, and internationalization decisions, on the other; review the 
related existing empirical evidence; and develop our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses our 
baseline specification and estimation methodology. Section 5 describes the data and 
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provides descriptive statistics. We discuss our empirical results in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Institutional environment in China 
2.1. Internationalization 
Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s export performance has been 
phenomenal. In 2007, the Chinese government has set up the China Investment 
Corporation (CIC), with the aim of actively encouraging Chinese firms to expand 
operations abroad (Brainard and Fenby, 2007). China’s economic expansion overseas is 
occurring at different levels of engagement using various modes of internationalization. 
Exporting is by far the most significant aspect of internationalization in terms of economic 
value (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). In particular, China’s total exports increased 
tremendously during the last three decades: from US$8 billion (around 1 percent of world 
exports) in 1978-89 to US$1,442 billion (13.4 percent) in 2005-06 (Athukorala, 2009). In 
2006, China became the world’s second largest exporter after Germany, and in 2010, the 
largest exporter (CIA, 2010). In 2007, its exports to GDP ratio was at 37.5 per cent, more 
than three times higher than the average level of around 10 per cent characterizing the 
other major economies such as the US, Japan, India, and Brazil (Athukorala, 2009). The 
technological sophistication of Chinese exports has also increased substantially and these 
exports now show significant overlap with the products of OECD countries (Schott, 2008). 
China is therefore clearly an ideal laboratory to explore the internationalization behavior of 
firms. 
 
2.2 Managerial incentives 
Despite these achievements, the corporate governance systems of Chinese listed firms and 
the institutions that support them have long been criticised for their ineffectiveness 
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(Clarke, 2003; Allen et al., 2005). In particular, despite the numerous ownership reforms 
that took place during the last decades, the Chinese government not only dominates over 
economic affairs, but also retains a substantial portion of ownership in a large number of 
listed corporations.  
Given that most of the assets in China are owned by the state, historically, the 
government adopted various incentive systems to make the management of these assets 
more efficient. In addition to the partial privatization and corporatization of former SOEs, 
these mainly include managerial autonomy and a management responsibility system (Su, 
2005). During the 1980s, the Chinese government introduced managerial autonomy by 
decentralizing managerial decision rights of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the 
central government down to the firm level. In addition, as discussed in Bai and Xu (2005), 
as part of the economic reform process in the 1980s, the Chinese central government 
delegated some of its decision rights (including exporting) to SOE managers, in order to 
induce them to become more efficient. This exercise was motivated by the central 
government’s willingness to promote markets and to gradually phase out its central 
planning function (Fan et al., 2007).  Groves et al. (1994) provide evidence that managerial 
autonomy improved corporate productivity
4
.  
Subsequently, other forms of managerial incentives such as CEO pay-performance 
sensitivities and CEO turnover-performance sensitivities were introduced. Yet, large 
government ownership and control have been found to weaken the positive effects of these 
managerial incentives (Kato and Long, 2006 a, b, c; Conyon and He, 2011)
5
. 
More recently, following the 2005-2006 split-share structure reform, which 
removed restrictions on managerial stock ownership, the literature has considered 
managerial ownership as another type of managerial incentive. A number of studies 
document that, with the deepening of market-oriented reforms, the introduction of foreign 
investment and the global pay benchmark, managers’ ownership shares in Chinese publicly 
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listed corporations have considerably increased in recent years
6
. For example, average 
managerial ownership rose from less than 1% before 2000 (Tian and Estrin, 2008) to 
around 8% in 2010
7
. Furthermore, Conyon and He (2011, 2012) report that the worth of 
CEO share ownership is much higher than their executive pay (greater than 400 times in 
2010). Since the state imposes a ceiling on how much SOE managers can be paid, some 
managers may choose to shirk instead of being productive, while other productive 
managers may enjoy on-the job consumption or perquisites (Fan et al., 2011). By contrast, 
equity ownership directly links managers’ efforts to their wealth, giving them strong 
incentives to work hard
8
.  
In addition, considering that Chinese firms are characterized by severe agency 
problems due to the separation of ownership and control (Qian, 1996; Xu et al., 2005)
9
, 
equity ownership provides an important mechanism to align the top management’s 
interests with those of shareholders and to focus managers’ efforts on value-increasing 
decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Lin et al. (2009) show a large and significant effect of insiders’ equity ownership 
on the efficiency of Chinese corporations. Along similar lines, Chow (1997) observes that 
whatever the type of managerial incentive system adopted by the government, there is a 
positive association between the profit of the enterprise and the economic benefits to the 
management. Therefore, he rightly stresses that “providing incentives for the management 
of publicly owned assets is a key to China’s success” (Chow, 1997, p. 321). 
In the light of these developments, it is increasingly interesting to see how 
internationalization and managerial ownership, which are two constantly evolving 
phenomena, interact with each other in the Chinese context. This is the main objective of 
our study. 
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3. Literature review and hypotheses 
In this section, we review the literature on the agency theory of managerial decision-
making and its impact on firms’ export market participation decisions, and develop testable 
hypotheses.  
As we discussed in the introduction, the international trade literature has made 
significant progress in explaining firms’ export market participation decisions. Sunk costs 
such as gathering information on foreign markets, developing marketing channels, 
adapting products and packaging to foreign taste, and learning to deal with new 
bureaucratic procedures play an important role in determining these decisions (Greenaway 
and Kneller, 2007). As such, only large and productive firms can achieve a net present 
value of profits from exports sufficiently large to offset the entry sunk costs. Other studies 
have also shown how financial factors affect firm export market participation decisions 
(see, for instance, Greenaway et al., 2007). 
Yet, the literature on firm heterogeneity and exporting has largely neglected the 
importance of managerial ownership and other corporate governance characteristics, which 
have been found to be pervasive in other aspects of firm behavior, such as financing and 
investment in fixed capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; and Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Entering foreign markets engenders large ex-
ante fixed sunk costs, which can be seen as a form of investment in intangible assets, as 
modelled in Melitz (2003). This investment involves risk and uncertainty (Dixit, 1989; 
Roberts and Tybout, 1997), including a potential bankruptcy risk (Caggese and Cuñat, 
2013)
10
. It also reflects complexity and information asymmetry between owners and 
managers (Morck and Yeung, 1991), and between firms and lenders such as banks 
(Caggese and Cuñat, 2013). Given the association between the decision to enter export 
markets and an investment decision, it can be argued that managerial incentives, and, more 
in general, corporate governance mechanisms, which have been found to have significant 
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effects on corporate investment, may have important bearings on this decision as well. This 
suggests that differences in corporate governance may explain observed differences in 
firms’ export behavior: it is possible that only firms with robust governance structures are 
able to engage in international activities. Alternatively, suboptimal governance structures 
may prevent top managers from participating in export markets. Thus, by exploring how 
governance issues in general and managerial ownership in particular affect exporting 
decisions, a new dimension corporate governance is added to the firm heterogeneity 
theory of international trade.  
Only a few studies have analyzed the relationship between corporate governance 
and firms’ internationalization decisions. Examples of these are Hobdari et al. (2011) who, 
focusing on Slovenian and Estonian firms, find that firms under the control of employees 
and/or managers tend to export more, whilst state control tends to have a negative effect on 
firms’ export orientation. Along similar lines, Filatotchev et al. (2007) show that 
managers’ independence and board participation of foreign stakeholders are positively 
associated with the internationalization decisions of Polish and Hungarian companies. 
Buck et al. (2000) and Filatotchev et al. (2001, 2008) conclude that managerial ownership 
and managers’ decision making independence enhance both the export propensity and 
intensity of firms in transition economies. Furthermore, Calabro et al. (2009) and Calabro 
and Mussolino (2013) show that board characteristics have an important impact on the 
internationalization decisions of family businesses in Norway.  
To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of studies have focused on links 
between internationalization and corporate governance in the Chinese context. Among 
these, Lu et al. (2009) use data on listed companies over the period 2002 to 2005 and find 
that CEO share ownership and the ratio of outside directors in the board are positively 
associated with firms’ exporting decisions, whilst ownership concentration is negatively 
associated with it. Fu et al. (2010) use data on Chinese non-listed manufacturing firms over 
11 
 
 
 
the period 1999 to 2003 and show that wholly foreign owned firms and joint-ventures with 
foreign control have higher export propensity and intensity than domestic firms or joint-
ventures with domestic control. Yi (2014) and Yi and Wang (2012) use data on 
approximately 30,000 firms operating in the Zhejiang province over the period 2001-2003 
and find that especially for small and medium-sized enterprises, foreign ownership is 
positively associated with firms’ export decisions, while state ownership appears to make 
exporting less likely. We build on these studies by making use of a larger and more 
representative dataset for a much more recent post-split-share structure reform time period, 
by analyzing the effects of a broader range of corporate governance variables on firms’ 
export propensity and intensity, and by differentiating firms into state-controlled and 
privately-controlled. We next turn to how specific internal governance mechanisms can be 
used to provide managers with the incentives necessary to make investment decisions, 
including the decision to enter export markets.  
 
3.1 Managerial ownership  
In a situation where managerial actions and/or the details of the investment opportunities 
are not perfectly observable by shareholders, there will be an incomplete contracting 
against managerial policy choices. One way to solve this problem is to give managers 
incentives in the form of equity stakes in the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This helps 
to resolve managers’ moral hazard problems by aligning their incentives with the interests 
of the shareholders. We refer to this as the interest alignment effect. Consistent with this 
prediction, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) argue that managers’ holdings of common 
stock and options in the firm reduce incentive problems by motivating managers to make 
value-increasing investment decisions. Along similar lines, Denis et al. (1997) find that 
managerial equity ownership is positively associated with value-increasing corporate 
decisions. More recently, Coles et al. (2006) provide evidence that managerial holdings of 
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shares and stock options provide managers with incentives to implement riskier policy 
choices, including more investment in R&D. Although these studies are based on US data, 
their findings are likely to apply to the Chinese case as well. This is confirmed by Lin et al. 
(2009), who show that the level of firm efficiency in China is positively associated with 
insiders’ ownership. Similarly, using data from 970 Chinese listed firms over the period of 
2007-2008, Liu et al. (2012) argue that managerial ownership is positively related to the 
performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
A counter-argument is provided by Amihud and Lev (1981) and May (1995) who 
show that when managers’ shareholding is sufficiently large, they will become entrenched 
and engage in risk-reduction activities, adopting investment and financing policy choices 
which reduce firms’ idiosyncratic risk at the expense of shareholders’ interests. Similarly, 
John et al. (2008) argue that managers with large insider ownership stakes in firms may opt 
for conservative investment policies, even to the extent of passing up risky projects with 
high positive net present value to the detriment of shareholders. Furthermore, according to 
La Porta et al. (1999), when managerial ownership reaches a threshold, further increasing 
it is likely to make managers entrenched, which may lead them to abuse power and exploit 
small shareholders instead of undertaking value-enhancing investment projects. We refer 
to this as the entrenchment effect.  
In a seminal work based on US data, Morck et al. (1988) provide the first empirical 
evidence for a non-monotonic relationship between managerial shareholding and 
performance. Using a piecewise linear model, they find that until inside ownership reaches 
5%, increasing ownership results in higher firm value (i.e. Tobin’s Q increases); between 
5% and 25%, increasing ownership negatively affects firm value; and finally firm value 
rises with inside ownership thereafter (but the effects are small). The rationale suggested 
by Morck et al. (1988) for this non-monotonic relationship is as follows. Managers have a 
natural tendency to indulge their preferences to the detriment of other shareholders. 
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Consistent with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) alignment hypothesis, at lower levels of 
managerial ownership, further increases in managers’ ownership align their interest with 
that of other shareholders, and thus, they work hard to maximize firm value, benefitting all 
shareholders (shared benefits). Yet, increasing managers’ stock ownership not only gives 
them a residual claim on profit, but also increases their voting power, insulating them from 
other disciplinary forces, and making them more entrenched. This provides managers with 
incentives to use corporate assets for their own (private) benefits. Similarly, McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) examine the relationship between insider ownership and performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q using a quadratic model for insider ownership, and find an inverted 
U-shaped relation for insider ownership. More recently, Kim and Lu (2011) report 
evidence suggesting a hump-shaped relation between managerial ownership and R&D 
expenditure of US firms. Along similar lines, some recent studies show that in the Chinese 
context, managerial ownership is positively associated with corporate performance. Yet, 
very high levels of ownership show negative performance effects (Li et al., 2007b, and Hu 
and Zhou, 2008).  
Moving the above literature forward, we investigate the extent to which managerial 
ownership affects Chinese listed firms’ export market participation decisions. We expect 
the alignment and entrenchment effects to apply to these decisions in the same way as they 
have been found to apply to firm performance, in general, and other risky corporate 
activities such as R&D expenditure, in particular. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: There is a non-monotonic (inverted U-shaped) relationship between managerial 
ownership and firms’ export propensity and intensity. Specifically, at low levels of 
managerial ownership, increases of the latter will rise export propensity and intensity, 
thanks to the alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests. Yet, at high levels 
of managerial ownership, further increases of the latter will lower export propensity and 
intensity, due to the managerial entrenchment effect. 
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3.2 Other ownership types  
We next examine the extent to which other ownership types, in addition to managerial 
ownership, affect export propensity and intensity. In particular, we focus in turn on the 
effects of state, legal person, and foreign ownership. 
  
3.2.1 State ownership 
Research from both developed countries and developing countries (including China) often 
shows that state ownership contributes to operational inefficiency and poor performance in 
firms (Megginson et al., 1994; Shleifer, 1998; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Kato & 
Long, 2006a, b, c). This can be due to the following reasons: (i) poor motivation of the top 
management team, (ii) excess labor and wages, (iii) appointment of people with political 
influence to senior positions by government without considering their expertise, (iv) 
pursuit of multi-goals, namely social and political goals, and (v) higher transaction costs, 
(vi) divergence between cash flow rights and control rights for the controlling shareholder: 
while government agents/bureaucrats have control over SOEs, the cash flow rights of 
SOEs belong to the state or the Treasury.  
In the Chinese context, substantial state ownership is observed in transformed 
SOEs, which are generally inefficient and reluctant to undertake risky value-enhancing 
investments such as venturing into international markets. The reluctance of SOEs to export 
can be explained as follows. First, SOE managers in Chinese listed corporations face 
complex agency problems, soft budget constraints, corruption, and have weaker incentives 
than their counterparts at privately-controlled firms (Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005; 
Yi and Wang, 2012)
 11
. This explains why innovation activities, which are typically risky 
and value-enhancing, are significantly lower in SOEs than in non-SOEs (Guariglia and 
Liu, 2014), and why SOEs’ participation in export markets is limited.  
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Second, Chinese SOEs are generally expected to pursue several political and social 
objectives (Bai and Xu, 2005), which often do not go hand in hand with profit 
maximization, and hence, make these companies less competitive in export markets. Third, 
state-owned firms typically have lower productivity than firms owned by other agents, 
which provides an additional barrier to export entry (Yi and Wang, 2012). Finally, 
considering that the state holds shares in strategically important resources and energy 
industries, such as petroleum, nuclear fuel, raw chemical material, mining and supply of 
electric and heat power, gas and water, which are less export-oriented industries in China 
(Lee, 2009), it is reasonable to expect that firms with considerable state-owned shares are 
less likely to export
12
. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between state ownership and firms’ export propensity 
and intensity. 
 
3.2.2 Legal person ownership 
Legal person shareholders in China are represented by domestic institutions such as  
mutual funds, government agents, or insurance companies. Several studies suggest that 
these shareholders have the opportunity, necessary capacity, and incentives (due to their 
large stake in a firm) to monitor managers’ activities in order to enhance firm performance 
(Cornett, et al, 2007), and are likely to support risky policy choices including 
internationalization (George and Prabhu, 2000). Institutional investors can also influence a 
firm’s strategic behavior through persuasion and private or public activism (Tihanyi et al., 
2003). In general, institutional shareholders also tend to have a longer tenure, which leads 
them to adopt longer investment horizons. This can mitigate the incentives for myopic 
investment decisions and thus lead to greater investment efficiency. 
In the case of Chinese listed firms, some studies show that legal person 
shareholding is positively associated with firm performance since institutional shareholders 
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have diverse professional backgrounds and are usually the largest shareholder of the firm 
(Sun and Tong, 2003). Among these, using a sample of 1211 listed firms over the period of 
2001-2005, Yuan et al. (2008) document a positive impact of mutual funds’ ownership on 
corporate performance. In contrast, other researchers point out that mutual funds and 
insurance companies are often owned wholly or partially by different levels of 
government, which may lead to agency problems, which in turn may imply that fewer 
risky and value-enhancing investment choices are made
13
. Among these, Wei et al. (2005) 
report a negative relationship between legal person shareholding and firm value measured 
using Tobin’s Q. Given the contrasting findings in the literature, we make no ex-ante 
prediction on the effects of legal persons’ shareholding on firms’ internationalization 
decisions.  
 
3.2.3 Foreign ownership 
The literature has traditionally argued that in emerging economies, the participation of 
foreign capital in domestic firms increases the probability of internationalizing their 
operations. Five main mechanisms can explain this conjecture. First, firms with foreign 
investors are more likely to adopt international standards of governance and business 
practices, which facilitate entry into international markets (Jackson and Strange, 2008). 
Second, these firms generally possess intangible firm-specific assets, such as advanced 
technology, marketing skills, brand name, and market networks, which provide them with 
a competitive advantage in the international market. Third, because they typically have 
well-diversified portfolios and superior monitoring abilities, foreign institutional investors 
are more likely to encourage firms in emerging markets to invest in risky ventures such as 
internationalization (Filatotchev, 2007). Fourth, foreign shareholders are more likely to 
pressure firms to employ better qualified CEOs/managers with international experience, 
who may favor exporting activities. Finally, multinational enterprises often take emerging 
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economies like China, as the export platform to serve their home market or other markets 
(Fu et al., 2010).  
In the Chinese context, Fu et al. (2010) use data on Chinese non-listed 
manufacturing firms over the period 1999 to 2003, to show that wholly foreign owned 
firms and joint-ventures with foreign control have a higher propensity to export and a 
higher export intensity than domestic firms or joint-ventures with domestic control. 
Similarly, Yi (2014) and Yi and Wang (2012) use data on approximately 30,000 firms 
operating in the Zhejiang province over the period 2001-2003 and find that especially for 
small and medium-sized enterprises, foreign ownership is positively associated with firms’ 
export decisions. In line with their findings, we hypothesize that: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and firms’ export 
propensity and intensity. 
 
3.3 Board of directors characteristics and exporting decisions 
Traditional theoretical arguments (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993), 
recent advances in the development of formal economic theories of boards of directors 
(Raheja, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 2008), and numerous empirical studies assert that boards 
of directors should help to resolve governance issues inherent in the management of a firm. 
Boards of directors are in fact entrusted with the power to hire, fire, evaluate, and 
compensate top management teams and curb their non-shareholder wealth-maximizing 
behavior. Thus, it is expected that boards of directors mitigate agency costs associated with 
the separation of ownership and control, enhancing the performance of the firms and, 
consequently, shareholders’ wealth. In this spirit, in most countries, corporate laws require 
that firms should be governed by a board of directors. The question of how size and 
composition of the board are effective in curbing managerial opportunistic behavior and, 
thus, improving corporate performance dominates empirical studies in a substantial part of 
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the corporate governance literature. However, this empirical research provides mixed 
results. 
 
3.3.1 Board size  
Research indicates that the size of the board is an important governance mechanism as it 
affects its ability to be an effective monitor and guide. Monks and Minow (2004) suggest 
that since larger boards are able to commit more time and effort to overseeing 
management, board monitoring can improve the quality of managerial decision-making 
and lead to better firm performance. Adams and Mehran (2003) provide evidence 
suggesting that larger boards increase monitoring effectiveness and provide for greater 
board expertise. Recently, Coles et al. (2008) argue that complex firms (as proxied by size 
and business diversification) can benefit by having larger number of directors on their 
boards, since large and complex firms need directors’ advise, counsel and expertise. They 
provide empirical support for their argument in that, in the case of complex firms, Tobin’s 
Q increases with board size. Yet, it is negatively related with board size in small firms.  
By contrast, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) theoretically argue that 
larger boards are less effective in group decision-making and strategy formulation, and 
contribute to the entrenchment of CEOs. The reason for this is that large boards hardly 
reach consensus on their decisions, and agency problems such as directors’ free-riding may 
increase within large boards. Prior studies also suggest that larger boards may lead to a low 
level of individual motivation and thus adversely affect their members’ commitment and 
effective participation in decision making (Dalton et al., 1999). Yermack (1996) and 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) support this argument by providing empirical evidence that firm 
performance is enhanced by smaller boards.  
We believe this last set of arguments is likely to apply to the Chinese case. In line 
with this conjecture, Li et al. (2007a) and Conyon and He (2012) show evidence that in the 
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Chinese context, larger boards are inconsequential or less effective in specific actions such 
as the determination of CEO compensation. Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) argue that 
large boards risk being dominated by powerful shareholders. They provide empirical 
evidence that although board size does not influence related-party transactions, it is 
associated with larger labor redundancies in Chinese listed SOEs. They conclude that large 
boards might favor the expropriation of minority investors. The increased agency problems 
associated with large boards (e.g. managers’ entrenchment, directors’ free riding, 
tunneling) are therefore likely to have a negative impact on Chinese firms’ export 
propensity and intensity. We therefore hypothesize that:   
H4: There is a negative relationship between the size of the board of directors and firms’ 
export propensity and intensity. 
 
3.3.2 Board independence 
Because of their independence and concern to maintain their reputation in the external 
labor market , non-executive directors will effectively monitor the actions of the executive 
directors and managers so as to ensure that they are pursuing policies congruent with 
interests of shareholders and complement expert knowledge of top management (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Cadbury, 1992). Researchers suggest that because of their 
education and broad knowledge, experience, reputation and networks with other 
institutions, outside directors may play an information and service role, as well as a 
resource role, and also assist in making important strategic decisions (Zahra, 2003). 
However, since an institutional environment which facilitates the effective 
functioning of outside directors has not yet been well established in China, some 
researchers cast doubt on the qualities and independence of outside directors. They also 
argue that outside directors are appointed merely to meet the requirements of the 
regulations and for the prestige of their value and, consequently, do not play their role as 
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effectively as their counterparts in developed countries (Clarke, 2003; Lau et al., 2007). 
They also point out that in China, independent directors are either lacking necessary 
financial and practical business knowledge or too busy to care about problems of listed 
companies and, consequently, find it difficult to provide a significant contribution to, and 
exert any substantial influence on the important decisions other than ornamenting the 
board
14
. We therefore pose the following hypothesis: 
H5: There is no association/a negative association between the proportion of outside 
directors in the board and firms’ export propensity and intensity. 
 
3.4 Our contribution 
Our main aim in this paper is to study the effect of managerial ownership on export 
propensity and intensity of Chinese listed companies, allowing for the relationship to be 
non-linear, controlling for a wide range of other corporate governance variables, using a 
more representative data sample and a more recent time period than previous studies, and 
differentiating firms into state- and privately-controlled. Our paper contributes to the trade 
literature by including governance components as new elements of firm heterogeneity, 
with the aim of better explaining the determinants of both export propensity and intensity. 
It also contributes to the growing literature on managerial incentives, and in particular 
managerial ownership, in the context of transition economies (Kato and Long, 2011). 
Furthermore, as our dataset spans the period 2004-2010, our study provides empirical 
evidence on some not previously documented consequences of the 2005-2006 split-share 
structure reform, through which non-tradable shares were floated in the open markets, and 
following which restrictions on managerial stock ownership were removed.  
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4. Baseline specifications and estimation methodology 
4.1 Baseline specification 
Our baseline model links firms’ export decisions with corporate governance factors and 
firm characteristics, as follows:  
 
EXPDUMit or EXPINTit =  β0 +  β1 (EXPDUMi(t-1) or EXPINTi(t-1)) +  β2DOS i(t-1) + β3DOS
2
 i(t-1)  +β4SOSi(t-1) +   
+β5LPSi(t-1) +  β6FOWNSi(t-1)  +  β7 BODSIZE(t-1)) + β8INDIRi(t-1) +β9SIZEi(t-1) + β10AGEit +  
+β11PRODi(t-1) + β12CIRi(t-1) + β13MBRi(t-1) + β14LEVi(t-1)+ β15LIQTYi(t-1) +  
+ vi  +  vt   + vj   +  vr  +   it             (1)                           
 
where i indexes firms, t years. Table A1 in the Appendix provides definitions and expected 
signs for all variables used in this paper. When examining the probability of exporting, the 
dependent variable is export propensity (EXPDUM), i.e a binary variable taking the value 
of one if the firm exports, and zero otherwise. When we consider export intensity, on the 
other hand, the dependent variable (EXPINT) is a censored variable, which is zero if the 
firm does not export, and takes the actual value of the ratio of exports to total sales, 
otherwise.  
Since previous studies provide strong evidence that exporting activity is 
characterized by high persistence due to the sunk start-up cost a firm needs to pay to enter 
export markets (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 2004), we include 
the lagged dependent variable among our explanatory variables. Its coefficient can be 
interpreted as a measure for the path dependency of exporting activities.  
The other independent variables in Equation (1) include proxies aimed at testing 
the effects of corporate governance mechanisms and other control variables proved by 
previous studies to be influential determinants of firms’ exporting decisions.  
Focusing on corporate governance mechanisms, we include managerial 
shareholding (DOS) and its square
15
. We also include legal person shareholding (LPS), 
foreign shareholding (FOWNS)
16
, and state shareholding (SOS)
17
. Furthermore, we 
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include board size (BOARDSIZE) and the proportion of independent directors in the board 
(INDIR). We include these corporate governance variables first one by one, then in groups, 
and finally all together. 
In line with previous studies, Equation (1) also includes several additional variables 
to control for a set of firm-specific characteristics that are likely to be correlated with 
firms’ internationalization decisions. These are firm size (SIZE), labor productivity 
(PROD), the capital intensity ratio (CIR), firm age (AGE), the market-to-book ratio 
(MBR), the leverage ratio (LEV) and the liquidity ratio (LIQTY).  
Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total real sales at the firm level. A 
positive relationship between firm size and foreign activities such as exporting is often 
considered as a stylized fact, as several studies found that both the probability of exporting 
and export intensity rise with firm size (see, for instance, Greenaway et al., 2007; and 
Wagner, 2010). A larger size reflects firms’ ability to attract and deploy resources (such as 
finance, expertise, and so on) needed for international operations; economies of scale in 
production; and also a higher capacity for taking risks (e.g. investment in R&D and 
development of new products) due to internal diversification. Consequently, large firms 
produce at lower average cost and may display higher productivity than smaller firms, and 
are, as such, more likely to export. Firm age is expected to have a positive association with 
export propensity and intensity, given that older firms are likely to suffer less from 
asymmetric information problems, which may make it easier for them to obtain the 
financing necessary to venture abroad. Labor productivity is measured as the ratio of real 
sales to the number of employees. A higher productivity reflects firms’ success in 
generating the profits necessary to recover the sunk costs that need to be faced when 
entering export markets. Consequently, we expect more productive firms to be more likely 
to export (Bernard and Jensen 2004). Capital intensity is calculated as the ratio of real 
fixed assets to the number of employees. More capital intensive firms are expected to be 
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more likely to engage in export activity. Growth opportunities are proxied by the market-
to-book ratio. If managers’ decisions to invest in export activities reflect a real growth 
opportunity, we would expect a positive relationship between the market-to-book ratio and 
international expansion decisions. Leverage, which is defined as the total debt to total 
assets ratio, is used to capture the effect of capital structure. As in Greenaway et al. (2007), 
we expect a negative relationship between leverage and export market participation 
decisions, as high leverage is generally associated with unhealthy balance sheets. Liquidity 
is given by the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities to total assets. Firms with 
higher liquidity have been proved in previous literature to have a higher probability to 
export and a higher export intensity (Greenaway et al., 2007).  
The error term in Equation (1) is made up of five components. vi is a firm-specific 
effect; vt, a time-specific effect, which we control for by including time dummies capturing 
business cycle effects; vj, an industry-specific effect, which we take into account by 
including industry dummies; and vr, a region-specific effect, which we control for by 
including a full-set of regional dummies. Finally, it is an idiosyncratic component. 
 
4.2 Estimation methodology 
4.2.1 Random- effects probit and tobit models 
To examine the extent to which corporate governance factors determine export propensity 
and intensity, we use two estimation methods. The first is a random-effects probit model 
used to estimate the probability of exporting. The second is a random-effects tobit model 
used for export intensity (measured as the ratio of foreign sales to total sales). Since the 
export ratio is characterized by a large number of zeroes, the tobit model is appropriate. 
We use random-effects probit and tobit models to control for unobserved heterogeneity: 
unobserved attributes, such as managers’ skills, and attitudes towards risk are in fact likely 
to affect both the probability of exporting and the amounts exported.  
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4.2.2 Endogeneity 
Our estimates may be affected by reverse causality. The relationship between governance 
mechanisms and exporting may in fact be dynamic, in the sense that on the one hand, 
robust governance systems may facilitate exporting decisions. Yet, on the other hand, a 
firm’s increased participation in international markets may require additional equity 
ownership to be awarded to managers to compensate their efforts in dealing with the 
additional complexities, information asymmetries, and agency problems arising from 
entering into international markets (Rose and Shepard, 1997). In addition, stronger 
governance structures may become necessary to ensure firm survival in the more 
competitive global environment. It is therefore crucial to control for “dynamic 
endogeneity” in our study. 
We address the potential endogeneity issue in two main ways. First, we include 
one-period lag of all corporate governance and other explanatory variables, with the 
exception of firm age and dummy variables, in all our specifications. A similar approach is 
also used in many previous studies (see, among others, Roberts and Tybout, 1997; and 
Coles et al., 2006).  
Second, following Bernard and Jensen, (2004) and Greenaway et al. (2007), we use 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator in addition to the random-effects 
probit and tobit estimators. However, unlike these authors, we use the system GMM 
estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) instead of the first-
difference estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The system GMM estimator estimates the 
relevant equation both in levels and in first-differences. First-differencing is used to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity. We use all right-hand side variables (except age and the 
dummies) lagged twice or more as instruments in the first-differenced equation, and first-
differences of these same variables lagged once as instruments in the level equation. The 
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system GMM estimator addresses the potential weak instrument problem. It should be 
noted, however, that being a linear probability model, the system GMM estimator is 
problematic in our particular case, as it fails to properly capture the curvature of the 
regression function in the proximity of 0 and 1. 
 
5. Data and descriptive statistics 
5.1 Sample and dataset 
The data used in this study are obtained from two Chinese databases namely, the China 
Stock Market Accounting Database (CSMAR) and Sino-fin for the period of 2004-2010
18
. 
The sample is composed of publicly listed firms traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges. As listed companies are typically seen as the best performers in the 
Chinese economy, we believe that looking at their export behavior represents an interesting 
research question. Additionally, as our objective is to assess the extent to which corporate 
governance variables affect firms’ export behavior, the analysis can only be performed on 
listed companies, as information on corporate governance characteristics is only available 
for these firms.  
Financial and utility industries are excluded. To reduce the influence of potential 
outliers, we exclude observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression 
variables. Since we lag all our independent variables once, we end up with a panel of 6315 
firm-year observations on 1420 companies over the period 2005-2010 for our empirical 
analysis. The panel has an unbalanced structure, with an average of 6 observations per 
firm. 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for our pooled 
sample. We observe that, on average, over one third of the listed firms (38.0%) are 
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involved in exporting activities. The average export to total sales ratio is 8.7 %. However, 
the average exporting intensity amongst exporters is 22.8 % (as shown in Table 4). 
The pooled mean (median) value of managerial ownership is 3.1% (0%). The state 
and legal persons hold 25.6% (25%) and 16.7% (5.2%) of the shares, respectively. Foreign 
shareholders, on average, hold 4 % (0%) of total issued shares. The average board size is 
9.4 (9.0) with a proportion of independent outside directors of 35.2% (33.3%).  
With respect to the control variables included in our baseline model, the average 
(median) firm size is about 1 billion RMB (0.43), and the average firm age, measured by 
the number of years since the establishment of the firm, is 11.52 (11)
19
. Productivity, 
measured as real sales per employee, is 0.55 million RMB (0.24). Capital intensity, 
proxied by the ratio of real fixed assets to the number of employees of the firm, is given by 
0.19 (0.095) million RMB fixed assets per employee. The average debt to asset ratio and 
the market-to-book ratio are 50.5% (51.2%) and 1.52 (1.22), respectively. Finally, the 
average liquidity, measured as net working capital over total assets, is 11.1% (10.6%). 
These summary statistics indicate that the sample employed in this study is 
comparable to others used in prior research on corporate governance and on corporate 
internationalization decisions. For example, the average export-sales ratio in our sample is 
similar to the averages (7%) reported by Lu et al. (2009) for the period 2002-2005. 
Similarly, the average foreign ownership is comparable to the average (4%) reported in 
Yuan et al. (2008) for the years 2001-2005. This also indicates that the level of foreign 
ownership has not changed significantly during the last decade. In addition, corporate 
governance and other firm characteristics are similar to those reported in recent studies on 
corporate governance in China, such as Conyon and He (2012) among others. 
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables. It is worth 
noting that both managerial and foreign shareholdings show a positive and statistically 
significant correlation with firms’ exporting activities, as suggested by our hypotheses H1 
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and H3. The results also highlight that state shareholding exhibits a negative and 
significant correlation with export propensity. This is consistent with the prediction of 
hypothesis H2. Legal person shareholding exhibits a negative and significant correlation 
with both export propensity and intensity. In line with hypothesis H4, board size has a 
significant negative relationship with international market expansion. Finally, the 
proportion of outside directors does not have any significant association with export 
propensity and intensity, which is consistent with hypothesis H5.   
Turning to the control variables, as expected, firm size has a significant positive 
correlation with internationalization. It is interesting to note that productivity has a 
negative but statistically insignificant correlation with exporting decisions, while the 
capital intensity ratio shows a significant negative correlation. These findings are opposite 
to what has been observed in developed countries and other emerging markets (Wakeling, 
1998). However, Lu et al. (2009) also show a negative relationship between exporting and 
the capital intensity ratio for Chinese firms. Furthermore, the leverage ratio exhibits a 
significant negative correlation with international sales expansion, while liquidity is 
positively related to both export intensity and propensity. Table 2 also suggests that given 
that the observed correlation coefficients are relatively low, multicollinearity should not be 
a serious problem in our study
20
.  
 
6. Evaluation of the results 
6.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 3 shows the distribution of observations across various categories of managerial 
ownership. We observe that out of a total of 6315 observations, 4829 are characterized by 
managerial ownership lower than 0.1%. 533 observations have managerial ownership 
between 0.1% and 5%; 239, between 5% and 25%; and 714, above 25%. The Table also 
shows that both export propensity and intensity tend to increase with managerial 
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ownership up to a 25% threshold, and decline thereafter. This is in line with our hypothesis 
H1, which posits an inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and 
export intensity and propensity.  
In Table 4, we report univariate mean comparisons of governance and firm 
characteristics between non-exporters and exporters. The statistics in the table show that, 
in line with our hypotheses H1 and H3, the fractions of managerial and foreign ownership 
are significantly higher for exporters. In addition, consistent with our hypothesis H2, non-
exporting firms have higher average state and legal person shareholding than exporting 
firms, the differences being significant. As predicted by our hypothesis H4, we observe 
that board size is higher for non-exporters. In line with hypothesis H5, we do not observe 
much difference in terms of proportion of outside directors between exporters and non-
exporters.  
Moving to firm characteristics, we observe that non-exporting firms display 
significantly higher capital intensity and lower market-to-book ratios than their exporting 
counterparts. In terms of productivity, there is no significant difference between exporters 
and non-exporters. These findings suggest that the self-selection hypothesis that the most 
efficient (productive) firms self-select into the export market (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; 
Aw et al., 2000) may not be true for Chinese exporters
21
. The results also show that 
exporters are slightly larger and younger than non-exporters. The larger liquidity ratio and 
lower leverage ratio in the exporting firms suggests that, in line with Greenaway et al. 
(2007) for UK firms, financially constrained firms are less likely to participate in export 
markets. 
This univariate analysis highlights some differences between non-exporters and 
exporters. The observed differences in the governance factors provide some preliminary 
evidence supporting our hypotheses. A potential problem in the univariate analysis is that 
since observations within a firm are unlikely to be independent, the statistical significance 
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is overstated (Anderson et. al., 2000). Another important problem is that the univariate 
tests do not control for several factors that may systematically affect the variables of 
interest. These factors include geographic location, industry membership, business cycle 
effects and so on (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). We address these issues in the 
multivariate analysis that follows in the next section.  
 
6.2 Multivariate analysis 
6.2.1 The decision to export, corporate governance, and firm characteristics 
Table 5 presents random-effects probit estimation results of our baseline model (1), where 
the dependent variable is the export dummy, equal to 1 if the firm exports, and 0 otherwise. 
To facilitate economic interpretation, we report marginal effects for those explanatory 
variables which display statistically significant coefficients.  
In column 1 of Table 5, we first estimate a naïve model in which the export 
propensity is regressed on managerial ownership, managerial ownership squared and a set 
of control variables including lagged export propensity, firm size, age, productivity, capital 
intensity, leverage, market-to-book ratio, liquidity and regional, industry, and year 
dummies. In subsequent columns, we then include other ownership and board structure 
variables one by one and in groups, to reach our baseline model in column 7. Firstly, the 
coefficients on managerial ownership and its square are consistently highly significant (at 
the 1% level) throughout all of the models. The former is positive, and the latter, negative. 
In line with hypothesis H1, these findings suggest there is strong evidence of a curvilinear 
relationship between managerial equity ownership and the probability of participating in 
export markets. Specifically, the probability of exporting first increases, then decreases as 
managerial ownership rises. At lower levels of managerial ownership, the positive effect of 
ownership strongly dominates any negative effects, consistent with Jensen and Meckling’s 
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(1976) incentive alignment hypothesis. The average turning point in managerial ownership 
ranges between 23% and 27%
22
.  
In columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 5, state ownership, legal person ownership, and 
foreign ownership are introduced respectively in to the models as additional independent 
variables. The results show that none of these additional ownership variables influences 
firms’ decisions to enter foreign markets. Even when all additional ownership variables are 
included together in column 5, none of them is significant at conventional levels. Our 
hypotheses H2 and H3 are therefore not supported
23
. 
In column 6, board size and the proportion of independent directors are included 
together with the managerial ownership variables. Both these additional variables exhibit 
negative and significant coefficients, supporting therefore our hypotheses H4 and H5. Our 
results are consistent with Clarke (2003) and Lau et al. (2007), who show that outside 
directors in the Chinese market do not contribute to strategic decisions and are just 
appointed to meet regulatory and legal requirements.  
Column 7 of Table 5 shows estimates for our baseline model (1), which includes all 
the independent and control variables. Even after introducing all other ownership and 
governance variables, the coefficient on the managerial ownership variable remains 
positive and precisely determined, and the coefficient on its squared value, negative and 
significant.  Board size and the proportion of independent directors in the board retain their 
negative signs. 
As for the effects of the control variables, the results show that in all specifications, 
the coefficient on lagged export status is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that Chinese exporting decisions are highly persistent, probably due to the high 
sunk costs, which need to be paid upfront to enter export markets
24
. Additionally, larger 
firms are more likely to be exporters. This is consistent with the prediction that large firms 
have more resources, experience economies of scale, and have access to external finance 
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which facilitate exporting decisions. The coefficient on firm age is negative and 
statistically significant at conventional levels. This is not consistent with our initial 
prediction, but can be explained considering that those state-owned enterprises with a long 
history of operations, which were then converted into listed companies might be less 
efficient, less dynamic, and hence, less likely to become exporters. This result also 
provides support for the born-global firm hypothesis, which suggests that it is young firms 
which are more likely to rapidly internationalize. 
        The coefficient associated with labor productivity is never statistically significant, 
which is inconsistent with the common wisdom that more productive firms are likely to 
enter foreign markets (Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999 and 2004). Similarly, the 
coefficient on the capital intensity ratio is negative, but not statistically significant
25
. The 
market-to-book ratio does not have a statistically significant association with exporting 
decisions, which is probably due to the fact that in the Chinese context, it is an imperfect 
measure of investment opportunities (Allen et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2009). This may be 
due to the fact that stock market-based measures of growth opportunities are not reliable in 
the Chinese financial markets (Wang et al., 2009; Conyon and He, 2012)
26
. In line with 
Greenaway at al. (2007), liquidity always attracts a positive and significant coefficient, 
suggesting that having more internal finance at hand facilitates firms’ entry in export 
markets. Finally, contrary to Greenaway et al. (2007), leverage displays an insignificant 
coefficient in columns 1 to 5, and a positive and significant coefficient in columns 6 and 7. 
The insignificant coefficients can be explained considering that our panel is made up of 
listed companies, all of which are relatively large and financially healthy. Hence, leverage 
should not make a big difference for these firms. The positive coefficients can be explained 
in the light of the fact that having obtained debt in previous years, these firms may be 
considered more creditworthy by banks, and may consequently obtain more loans in the 
present, which they can use to finance the sunk costs. Thus, they are more likely to become 
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exporters. It should be noted, however, that in columns 6 and 7, the coefficients on 
leverage are only marginally significant.  
So far, the results show that managerial ownership has an important influence on 
the export markets participation decisions of Chinese listed corporations. However, except 
for managerial ownership, we generally do not find significant effects for any other 
ownership variables. In addition, both board size and the proportion of independent 
directors in the board negatively affect firms’ internationalization decisions. 
 
6.2.3 Export intensity, corporate governance, and firm characteristics 
We now turn to export intensity measured as export sales over total sales, another measure 
of international involvement of firms. We investigate how managerial ownership and other 
governance mechanisms affect the volume of exports after entering the export markets. To 
this end, we replicate the specifications used in columns 1 to 7 of Table 5, using a random-
effects tobit model. Table 6 reports the results. Consistent with our previous findings, 
managerial ownership and its square attract a positive and a negative coefficient, 
respectively, in all models. Focusing on column 1, the marginal effects suggest that export 
intensity increases with managerial ownership up to a threshold of 26.85%, and then 
declines.  
Focusing on columns 2 to 7, we observe that other ownership variables do not 
influence export intensity, with the exception of state ownership, which, in accordance 
with our hypothesis H2, exhibits a negative coefficient in columns 5 and 7, and legal 
person shareholding, which also displays a negative coefficient in those same columns. 
Moving on to board characteristics, we observe that in line with our hypothesis H4, board 
size is negatively related to export intensity, whilst the percentage of independent directors 
has a statistically insignificant coefficient.  
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Furthermore, we observe that, once again, past exporting experience has strong 
large effects on firms’ export intensity. The coefficients on the other control variables 
indicate that, as in the probit regressions, young, large firms, with a higher liquidity show a 
higher export intensity. Finally, we can see that in most specifications, compared to firms 
in the Central region (which represent the excluded category), firms in the Coastal region 
tend to export more, whereas firms in the Western region are characterized by a lower 
export intensity. 
 
6.3 Robustness tests 
In this sub-section we verify whether our results are robust to using alternative estimation 
methods and specifications.  
 
6.3.1 Using alternative estimation methods 
First, columns 1 and 8 of Table 7 report system GMM estimates of our export propensity 
and intensity regressions. We use the system GMM estimator to control for the possible 
endogeneity of the regressors. We use all right-hand side variables, except age and the 
dummies, lagged twice or more as instruments in the first-differenced equation, and first-
differences of these same variables lagged once as instruments in the level equation. It 
should be noted, however, that being a linear probability model, the system GMM 
estimator is problematic in our particular case as it fails to properly capture the curvature 
of the regression function in the proximity of 0 and 1. The results show that once again, 
managerial ownership and it square display a positive and negative coefficient, 
respectively, and are both precisely determined. This confirms that managerial ownership 
and export propensity and intensity are linked by an inverted U-shaped relationship, with 
turning point of 27.47% in the former case and 24.24% in the latter.  
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        Furthermore, following Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), in columns 2 and 9 of Table 
7, we report estimates of our models for export propensity and intensity respectively, 
obtained using a piecewise regression. To this end, we allow for one change in the slope 
coefficient of managerial ownership at 25% (first quartile), which is close to the turning 
point identified in the regressions reported in Tables 5  and 6. With reference to Equation 
(1), we replace the managerial ownership variable and its square with the following two 
variables: the first (DOS025) is equal to the actual managerial ownership if this number is 
less than 0.25, and to 0.25 otherwise. The second (DOS25) is equal to (managerial 
ownership – 0.25) if managerial ownership is greater than 0.25, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
The results show that the first variable exhibits a positive and significant coefficient, whilst 
the second displays a negative and precisely determined coefficient. These findings 
suggest that at levels of managerial ownership lower than 25%, the likelihood and intensity 
of exporting increase with managerial ownership, whilst a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and exporting appears beyond the 25% threshold of managerial 
ownership. These new results confirm therefore our main findings and are in line with our 
hypothesis H1
27
. 
Our results in Tables 5 and 6 are also robust to using a pooled probit, pooled 
fractional probit (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996), and pooled tobit estimators with cluster- 
robust standard errors. In addition, our results are robust to using OLS and the “orthogonal 
deviations” variant of the GMM estimator, in which the fixed effects are eliminated by 
subtracting the forward means of each regression variable (Arellano and Bover, 1995)
 28
. 
All these results, which are not reported for brevity, but available upon request, confirm 
the curvilinear dependence of exporting decisions on managerial ownership predicted by 
our hypothesis H1. 
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6.3.2 Using dummy variable for managerial ownership and foreign ownership 
In columns 3 and 10 of Table 7, we provide estimates of our export propensity and export 
intensity regressions, which include a dummy equal to one if managerial ownership is 
greater than 0, and 0 otherwise; and a dummy equal to 1 if foreign ownership is greater 
than zero, and 0 otherwise. These dummies replace the continuous managerial and foreign 
ownership variables, which both exhibit medians equal to 0. The results show that the 
coefficient on the managerial ownership dummy is positive and precisely determined, 
whilst the coefficient on the foreign ownership dummy is also positive, but not statistically 
significant. This suggests that managerial ownership plays a more significant role than 
foreign ownership in firms’ internationalization decisions. 
 
6.3.3 Estimating separate regressions for state- and privately-controlled firms 
We next aim at verifying the extent to which our results hold for the subsamples of state- 
and privately-controlled firms. This exercise is motivated considering that top executives 
in the state sector are often appointed by party and government agencies and are typically 
party secretaries, government officials or veteran socialist managers (Walder, 2011). 
Additionally, appointments to top managerial posts in these companies are generally 
controlled by the state, and managerial autonomy is limited (Walder, 2011). As such, 
managers in state-controlled companies might have limited power as regards to the firms’ 
internationalization decisions
29
.  
  In contrast, top executives in the privately-controlled sector may have begun their 
careers in the state sector, but are no longer appointed by the state. The managers of these 
firms also have greater autonomy from state agencies than their counterparts in state-
controlled companies. Furthermore, their executives enjoy much higher levels of 
compensation and are more likely to hold significant ownership stakes (Walder, 2011). As 
a consequence of these developments, managers play a major role in all corporate 
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decisions, including those related to entry in export markets. Managerial incentives are 
therefore likely to affect firms’ internationalization decisions30.  
          In the light of these considerations, in columns 4/5 and 11/12 of Table 7, we provide 
separate estimates of Equation (1) for state-controlled and privately-controlled firms. The 
results show that managerial ownership only affects the exporting decisions of non-state 
firms. These results are consistent with a number of studies, which provide empirical 
evidence for the differential effects of other forms of managerial incentives, such as the 
sensitivities of top management compensation and turnover to firm performance and 
promotion tournaments, among state-controlled and privately-controlled Chinese listed 
firms (Kato and Long, 2006a, b, c, and 2011). Specifically, these studies suggest that 
managerial incentives derived from these incentive mechanisms are weakened by state 
ownership and control. We also observe that whilst board size has a negative and 
significant effect on the export propensity and intensity of both state- and privately 
controlled firms, the proportion of independent directors in the board is negatively related 
to the export decisions of privately-controlled firms only.  
 
6.3.4 Estimating separate regressions for the pre- and post-2006 period 
 It is important to take into account differences in our results before and after the 2005-
2006 split-share structure reform, following which non-tradable shares were floated 
through the open markets, for the following reasons. First, agency costs were significantly 
reduced following the reform (Li et al., 2011; Hou et al., 2013; Hou and Lee, 2014). 
Second, from 2006 onwards, corporations were allowed to incentivize their top 
management with stocks (Conyon and He, 2011). As a consequence of this, average 
managerial ownership rose from 1.1% in 2004 to 8.2% in 2010, managers’ interests 
became more aligned on average with stock market performance, and their conflicts of 
interest with outsider investors were reduced.  
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To take this into account, in columns 6/7 and 13/14 of Table 7, we provide separate 
estimates of Equation (1) for the pre- and post-2006 period
31
. The results show that 
managerial ownership and its square are only significant in the post-reform period. This 
suggests that, by removing restrictions on managerial stock ownership, the reform played 
an indirect role in enhancing Chinese firms’ internationalization activities. Furthermore, 
with the exception of board size which has a negative and marginally significant effect on 
export propensity in the pre-reform period, all other corporate governance variables only 
affect firms’ exporting decisions in the post-reform period. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we use a dataset made up of 1240 Chinese listed companies over the period 
2004-2010 to examine the effects of managerial ownership, other ownership types, and 
board characteristics on firms’ exporting decisions, distinguishing firms into state- and 
privately-controlled. This is the first study conducted on the topic on a dataset including 
the post-split-share structure reform period in China, the first to analyze differences 
between state-owned and other companies, and the first to include all relevant corporate 
governance variables in a unified framework.  
 We find that increasing managerial ownership is linked with a higher probability to 
enter export markets, and higher export intensity. Yet, after a threshold level of ownership 
of 23%-27% is reached, managers’ entrenchment tendencies become prominent, 
discouraging internationalization activities. We also observe that state ownership is 
negatively associated with export intensity; that the larger the board size, the lower the 
firm’s export propensity and intensity; and that firms with a higher proportion of 
independent directors in the board are generally less likely to export. Finally, larger, 
younger firms with higher liquidity are more likely to export and are also more likely to 
display higher export intensity. Our findings, which are robust to using different estimation 
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methods, are mainly driven by non-state firms in the post-reform period. 
Our paper contributes to the international trade literature by taking into account 
corporate governance components as new elements of firm heterogeneity, with the aim of 
better explaining the determinants of both export propensity and intensity. It also 
contributes to the corporate finance literature, which has looked at the effects of 
managerial ownership and corporate governance mechanisms on various aspects of 
corporate behavior, neglecting, however, firms’ exporting decisions. 
Our findings have policy implications. In order to promote the international 
presence of Chinese firms, the government should encourage a rise in managerial 
ownership up to its optimal level, through a revision of the compensation contracts of 
management teams, aimed at including company shares. Furthermore, given the concave 
relationship between managerial ownership and risk-taking activities such as international 
expansion, excessive managerial ownership should be avoided. In addition, in order to 
raise export propensity and intensity, companies should be encouraged to have smaller 
boards and to pay particular attention to the quality of the independent directors in their 
boards. Finally, state ownership should be further reduced. 
Our study suffers from a number of limitations. Firstly, since a limited number of 
firms have been involved in Outbound Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) during our 
sample period (Morck et al., 2008), we only use exports as a measure of firms’ degree of 
internationalization. In the future, we aim at complementing our study by also employing 
other measures of internationalization, such as OFDI. 
Secondly, we do not focus on the qualities of the CEOs/top management team, such 
as their international experience and education. Yet, these may have an important bearing 
on firms’ efforts in venturing abroad. As these data are not available in standard databases, 
a questionnaire-based survey would have to be conducted in order to complement this 
study. This is on the agenda for future research.  
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           Finally, in future research, we plan to undertake a comparative analysis of the 
effects of managerial ownership and other forms of corporate governance on a range of 
different corporate activities in China, other emerging economies, and developed countries.  
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Table 1.  Summary statistics of governance and firm characteristics for the pooled sample 
of companies. 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Export dummy (EXPDUM) 
6315 0.380 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Export intensity (EXPINT) 6315 0.087 0.177 0.000 0.000 0.869 
 
Governance  characteristics    
 
  
Managerial shareholding (DOS) 6315 0.031 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.748 
Legal person shareholding (LPS) 6315 0.167 0.207 0.052 0.000 0.869 
State shareholding (SOS) 6315 0.256 0.238 0.250 0.000 0.812 
Foreign shareholding (FOWNS) 6315 0.040 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.736 
Board size (BODSIZE) 6315 9.392 1.947 9.000 3.000 19.000 
Independent directors (INDIR) 6315 0.352 0.045 0.333 0.000 0.667 
 
Firm characteristics    
 
  
Firm size  (billion RMB)(SIZE) 6315 1.007 1.828 0.433 0.000 21.023 
Firm age (AGE) 6315 11.520 4.006 11.000 2.000 26.000 
Productivity (million RMB) (PROD) 6315 0.551 2.005 0.243 0.000 134.479 
Capital intensity (million  RMB) (CIR) 6315 0.190 0.736 0.095 0.000 37.074 
Market –to- book  ratio (MBR) 6315 1.516 0.854 1.218 0.477 11.222 
Leverage ratio (LEV) 6315 0.505 0.204 0.512 0.013 5.494 
Liquidity ratio (LIQTY) 6315 0.111 0.247 0.106 -3.437 0.915 
 
Notes:  This table reports summary statistics of the main variables used in our study. All variables are 
defined in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
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                   Table  2. Correlation matrix.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 EXPDUM 
1.00                
2 EXPINT 
0.63* 1.00               
3 DOSi(t-1) 0.10* 0.10* 1.00              
4 DOS
2
i(t-1) 0.07* 0.07* 0.86* 1.00             
5 LPSi(t-1) -0.08* -0.08* -0.28* -0.23* 1.00            
6 SOSi(t-1) -0.05* 0.00 -0.01 -0.05* -0.56* 1.00           
7 FOWNSi(t-1) 0.08* 0.10* -0.07* -0.05* -0.01 -0.05* 1.00          
8 BODSIZE(t-1) -0.03* -0.04* -0.09* -0.09* 0.14* -0.08* 0.07* 1.00         
9.  INDIRi(t-1) 0.00 -0.00 0.08* 0.07* -0.11* 0.02 0.01 -0.24* 1.00        
10 SIZEi(t-1) 0.11* 0.03* -0.12* -0.10* 0.15* -0.21* 0.14* -0.02 0.21* 1.00       
11 AGEit -0.07* -0.09* -0.34* -0.30* -0.14* -0.06* 0.06* 0.00 -0.03* 0.10* 1.00      
12 PRODi(t-1) -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03* -0.03* 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.14* 0.06* 1.00     
13 CIRi(t-1) -0.04* -0.03* -0.04* -0.03* 0.04* -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04* 0.06* 0.52* 1.00    
14 MBRi(t-1) 0.05* 0.02 0.07* 0.05* -0.24* -0.09* -0.08* 0.05* -0.08* -0.15* 0.11* -0.02 -0.02 1.00   
15 LEVi(t-1) -0.04* -0.07* -0.17* -0.14* 0.04* -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05* 0.21* 0.21* 0.06* 0.10* -0.16* 1.00  
16 LIQTYi(t-1) 0.06* 0.07* 0.24* 0.21* -0.09* 0.06* -0.02 0.04* -0.07* -0.12* -0.24* 0.05* -0.13* -0.64* 0.14* 1.00 
 
Notes: This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. * denotes significance at the 5% level. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables.
51 
 
 
 
Table 3. Average export propensity and intensity for different degrees of managerial 
ownership. 
 
Managerial ownership Observations Export propensity Export intensity 
DOS < .001 4829 0.35 0.08 
0.001 =<  DOS  < .05 533 0.42 0.12 
0.05 =<  DOS  < .25 239 0.60 0.17 
DOS  > .25 714 0.47 0.10 
  6315 
  Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dataset used in the revised paper. DOS represents managerial 
shareholding. See Table A1 in the Appendix for the precise definitions of this variable. 
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Table  4. Mean comparison of corporate governance and firm characteristics for non-
exporters and exporters.  
 
Variables 
Non-exporters Exporters Mean difference 
(t-statistic) 
Count Mean S.E. Count Mean  S.E. 
Export  Dummy 3915 0.000 0.000 2400 1.000 0.000 
 
 
Exports/Total sales 3915 0.000 0.000 2400 0.228 0.224 -0.228
***
 (-63.63) 
 
Governance  characteristics        
 
Managerial shareholding (DOS) 3915 0.022 0.094 2400 0.045 0.124 -0.023
***
 (-8.22) 
Legal person shareholding  (LPS) 3915 0.174 0.210 2400 0.155 0.202 0.019
***
 (3.62) 
State shareholding (SOS) 3915 0.272 0.240 2400 0.231 0.234 0.040
***
 (6.54) 
Foreign shareholding (FOWNS) 3915 0.033 0.098 2400 0.051 0.124 -0.018
***
 (-6.38) 
Board size (BODSIZE) 3915 9.442 2.022 2400 9.310 1.814 0.132
**
 (2.62) 
Independent directors (INDIR) 3915 0.352 0.046 2400 0.352 0.042 -0.000 (-0.30) 
 
Firm characteristics        
 
Firm size  (billion RMB) (SIZE) 3915 0.942 1.733 2400 1.115 1.970 -0.173
***
 (-8.43) 
Firm age (AGE) 3915 2.397 0.376 2400 2.341 0.400 0.056
***
 (5.59) 
Productivity (million RMB) (PROD) 3915 0.575 1.195 2400 0.513 2.872 6.189 (1.19) 
Capital intensity (million RMB)(CIR) 
3915 0.213 0.847 2400 0.153 0.506 5.989
**
 (3.14) 
Market- to-book  ratio (MBR) 3915 1.479 0.851 2400 1.576 0.855 -0.096
***
 (-4.37) 
Leverage ratio (LEV) 3915 0.512 0.195 2400 0.494 0.218 0.018
***
 (3.47) 
Liquidity ratio (LIQTY) 3915 0.100 0.253 2400 0.129 0.237 -0.029
***
 (-4.58) 
 
Notes: ***, **, and* denote, respectively, significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% for a two-tailed two 
sample t-test. t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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Table 5. The decision to export, corporate governance and firm characteristics.  
 
 Dynamic random-effects probit models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Governance variables       
DOSi(t-1) 2.139
*** 2.006*** 2.129*** 2.139*** 1.968** 2.159*** 2.011*** 
 (0.743) (0.761) (0.747) (0.744) (0.764) (0.750) (0.771) 
 [0.391] [0.348] [0.399] [0.396] [0.327] [0.399] [0.332] 
DOS2i(t-1) -3.758
*** -3.601*** -3.737*** -3.759*** -3.625*** -3.877*** -3.763*** 
 (1.376) (1.389) (1.386) (1.376) (1.390) (1.391) (1.406) 
 [-0.727] [-0.675] -0.743] [-0.733] [-0.693] -0.756] [-0.718] 
SOSi(t-1)  -0.091   -0.163  -0.150 
  (0.113)   (0.160)  (0.162) 
LPSi(t-1)   0.015  -0.108  -0.098 
   (0.121)  (0.171)  (0.172) 
FOWNSi(t-1)    0.006 -0.014  0.049 
    (0.222) (0.223)  (0.225) 
BODSIZE(t-1)      -0.412
*** -0.412*** 
      (0.123) (0.123) 
      [-0.060] [-0.060] 
INDIRi(t-1)      -1.026
* -1.050* 
      (0.551) (0.552) 
      [-0.143] [-0.154] 
Control variables        
EXPDUMi(t-1) 2.741
*** 2.739*** 2.741*** 2.741*** 2.738*** 2.748*** 2.744*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
 [1.822] [1.821] [1.822] [1.821] [1.818] [1.817] [1.812] 
SIZEi(t-1) 0.069
*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
 [0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.022] [0.021] 
AGEit -0.137
* -0.148** -0.137* -0.137* -0.155** -0.149** -0.166** 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.072) (0.075) 
 [-0.022] [-0.021] [-0.022] [-0.022] [-0.030] [-0.022] [-0.031] 
PRODi(t-1) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
CIRi(t-1) -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.023 -0.023 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049) (0.049) 
MBRi(t-1) -0.039 -0.042 -0.039 -0.039 -0.045 -0.020 -0.024 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
LEVi(t-1) 0.201 0.201 0.200 0.201 0.209 0.293
* 0.301* 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.159) (0.159) 
      [0.028] [0.033] 
LIQTYi(t-1) 0.298
** 0.299** 0.297** 0.298** 0.307** 0.323** 0.331** 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.144) 
 [0.062] [0.063] [0.063] [0.062] [0.068] [0.063] [0.069] 
COASTAL dummy 0.059 0.056 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.064 0.062 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
WESTERN dummy -0.059 -0.057 -0.059 -0.059 -0.054 -0.034 -0.029 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Inflection points 26.89% 25.78% 26.85% 27.01% 23.59% 26.39% 23.12% 
Observations 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 
Log-likelihood -1758.55 -1758.23 -1758.55 -1758.55 -1758.03 -1731.40 -1730.92 
Wald χ2 (P value) 3126.55 3126.67 3126.62 3126.53 3126.36 3079.50 3079.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable (EXPDUM) is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm exports, and 0 
otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in square brackets for those coefficients that are 
statistically significant. The Wald statistic is aimed at testing the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, levels respectively. See Table A1 in the 
Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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Table 6. Export intensity, corporate governance, and firm characteristics. 
 Dynamic random-effects tobit models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Governance variables       
DOSi(t-1) 0.233
*** 0.207*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 0.194** 0.238*** 0.197*** 
 (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.077) 
 [0.080] [0.071] [0.082] [0.081] [0.067] [0.082] [0.068] 
DOS2i(t-1) -0.432
*** -0.401*** -0.442*** -0.435*** -0.412*** -0.450*** -0.427*** 
 (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.141) (0.140) (0.142) 
 [-0.149] [-0.138] [-0.152] [-0.150] [-0.142] [-0.155] [-0.147] 
SOSi(t-1)  -0.018   -0.043
***  -0.045*** 
  (0.012)   (0.017)  (0.017) 
     [-0.015]  [-0.034] 
LPSi(t-1)   -0.007  -0.039
**  -0.039** 
   (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
     [-0.013]  [-0.012] 
FOWNSi(t-1)    0.012 0.003  0.008 
    (0.022) (0.022)  (0.022) 
BODSIZE(t-1)      -0.035
*** -0.036*** 
      (0.013) (0.013) 
      [-0.012] [-0.012] 
INDIRi(t-1)      -0.085 -0.092 
      (0.058) (0.058) 
Control variables        
EXPINTi(t-1) 1.083
*** 1.081*** 1.083*** 1.082*** 1.080*** 1.081*** 1.078*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 [0.373] [0.372] [0.373] [0.372] [0.372] [0.372] [0.372] 
SIZEi(t-1) 0.012
*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
AGEit -0.013
* -0.015** -0.013* -0.013* -0.018** -0.013* -0.019** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
 [-0.004] [-0.005] [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.006] [-0.005] [-0.006] 
PRODi(t-1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CIRi(t-1) -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
* -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
MBRi(t-1) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LEVi(t-1) 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
LIQTYi(t-1) 0.037
** 0.037** 0.038** 0.037** 0.040*** 0.038** 0.041*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] 
COASTAL dummy 0.010* 0.009 0.010* 0.010 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
WESTERN dummy -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 [-0.005] [-0.005] [-0.005] [-0.005]    
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Inflection points 26.85% 25.72% 26.97% 27.0% 23.59% 26.45% 23.13% 
Observations 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 
Proportion > 0 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 
Log-likelihood -300.58 -263.96 -236.35 -205.97 -272.25 -336.27 262.74 
Wald  χ2 (P value) 8535.29 8540.77 8535.16 8535.94 8548.34 8447.01 8460.69 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable (EXPINT) is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not export, and 
takes the value of the actual exports to total sales ratio, otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are 
in square brackets for those coefficients that are statistically significant.  The Wald statistic is aimed at testing the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficients are jointly equal to zero. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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        Table 7. Robustness tests. 
                                                   Export   propensity Export intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)  (14)  
 
System 
GMM 
Piecewise Dummies Non-state State 
Post- 
reform 
Pre- 
reform 
System GMM Piecewise Dummies Non-state State 
Post- 
reform 
Pre- 
reform 
Governance variables               
DOSi(t-1) 1.483
**   2.059** -1.572 2.024** -0.042 0.271**   0.247*** -0.322 0.183** 0.237 
 (0.628)   (0.855) (4.807) (0.800) (3.255) (0.131)   (0.085) (0.416) (0.083) (0.215) 
    [0.403]  [0.320]     [0.092]  [0.068]  
DOS2i(t-1) -2.699
**   -3.935*** 12.942 -3.711** -1.848 -0.559*   -0.481*** 1.421 -0.393*** -0.666 
 (1.300)   (1.466) (27.352) (1.444) (6.734) (0.310)   (0.148) (1.690) (0.152) (0.445) 
    [-0.786]  [-0.688]     [-0.180]  [-0.145]  
DOS025i(t-1)  1.274
**       0.112**      
  (0.606)       (0.051)      
  [0.188]       [0.038]      
DOS25i(t-1)  -1.240
*       -0.167**      
  (0.648)       (0.066)      
  [-0.281]       [-0.057]      
DOS-Dummyi(t-1)   0.151
**       0.021**     
   (0.071)       (0.010)     
   [0.021]       [0.007]     
SOSi(t-1) 0.074 -0.159 -0.118 -0.447 -0.036 -0.186 -0.170 0.015 -0.046
*** -0.038** -0.064 -0.031 -0.047** -0.043 
 (0.071) (0.162) (0.156) (0.408) (0.218) (0.174) (0.513) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.042) (0.022) (0.019) (0.040) 
         [-0.016] [-0.013]   [-0.017]  
LPSi(t-1) 0.021 -0.102 -0.063 -0.167 -0.145 -0.072 -0.354 0.020 -0.039
** -0.031* -0.033 -0.032 -0.035* -0.052 
 (0.071) (0.172) (0.165) (0.242) (0.295) (0.186) (0.542) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) (0.025) (0.030) (0.020) (0.042) 
         [-0.014] [-0.011]   [-0.013]  
FOWNSi(t-1) 0.187 0.045  -0.005 0.094 0.013 0.086 -0.008 0.007  0.014 0.023 -0.010 0.050 
 (0.366) (0.225)  (0.416) (0.323) (0.256) (0.563) (0.134) (0.022)  (0.039) (0.030) (0.026) (0.042) 
FOWNS-Dummyi(t-1)   0.113       0.012     
   (0.138)       (0.014)     
BODSIZE(t-1) 0.109 -0.407
*** -0.399*** -0.509** -0.317** -0.394*** -0.539* -0.007 -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.039* -0.032** -0.043*** -0.011 
 (0.112) (0.123) (0.123) (0.220) (0.156) (0.143) (0.278) (0.032) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) 
  [-0.059] [-0.058] [-0.064] [-0.054] [-0.076] [-0.016]  [-0.012] [-0.012] [-0.015] [-0.011] [-0.016]  
INDIRi(t-1) 0.594 -1.044
* -1.045* -2.240** -0.307 -1.114* -1.488 -0.054 -0.091 -0.094 -0.266*** 0.012 -0.144** 0.014 
 (0.606) (0.552) (0.552) (0.925) (0.723) (0.643) (1.212) (0.182) (0.058) (0.058) (0.097) (0.073) (0.070) (0.103) 
  [-0.152] [-0.158] [-0.435]  [-0.253]     [-0.099]  [-0.053]  
Control variables               
EXPDUMi(t-1) / EXPINTi(t-1) 0.716
*** 2.744*** 2.745*** 2.578*** 2.880*** 2.448*** 3.762*** 0.799*** 1.079*** 1.079*** 1.007*** 1.137*** 1.023*** 1.226*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.085) (0.070) (0.059) (0.136) (0.050) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.025) 
  [1.813] [1.814] [1.645] [1.921] [1.791] [1.840]  [0.372] [0.372] [0.376] [0.374] [0.378] [0.358] 
SIZEi(t-1) 0.011 0.079
*** 0.080*** 0.152*** 0.057** 0.098*** 0.004 -0.002 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009** 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) (0.038) (0.029) (0.025) (0.056) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
  [0.021] [0.022] [0.037] [0.016] [0.023]   [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] 
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AGEit -0.011 -0.170
** -0.149** -0.173 -0.124 -0.148* -0.385** -0.003 -0.019** -0.015* -0.020* -0.019* -0.020** -0.019 
 (0.028) (0.075) (0.075) (0.108) (0.110) (0.084) (0.183) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) 
  [-0.032] [-0.025]   [-0.035] [-0.029]  [-0.007] [-0.005] [-0.007] [-0.006] [-0.007]  
PRODi(t-1) 0.010 -0.002 -0.002 -0.134
** 0.051** -0.001 0.024 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.017** 0.006*** 0.001 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.063) (0.025) (0.014) (0.083) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) 
    [-0.028]       [-0.006] [0.002]   
CIRi(t-1) -0.009 -0.023 -0.025 0.070 -0.408
*** -0.022 -0.439 -0.020 -0.011 -0.011 0.007 -0.050*** -0.009 -0.051** 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.050) (0.064) (0.155) (0.048) (0.299) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.025) 
     [-0.084]       [-0.016]  [-0.015] 
MBRi(t-1) -0.001 -0.024 -0.021 0.023 -0.069 -0.024 0.153 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.019 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.035) (0.053) (0.047) (0.034) (0.267) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) 
LEVi(t-1) 0.082 0.304
* 0.302* 0.624** -0.159 0.411** -0.136 0.002 0.020 0.019 0.030 -0.007 0.025 0.002 
 (0.089) (0.159) (0.159) (0.250) (0.230) (0.177) (0.419) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.023) (0.019) (0.035) 
  [0.033] [0.033] [0.049]  [0.043]         
LIQTYi(t-1) 0.039 0.337
** 0.315** 0.471** 0.155 0.475*** -0.329 0.007 0.041*** 0.038** 0.049** 0.020 0.048*** 0.024 
 (0.069) (0.144) (0.143) (0.233) (0.196) (0.161) (0.382) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.031) 
  [0.070] [0.064] [0.080]  [0.084]   [0.014] [0.013] [0.018]  [0.018]  
COASTAL dummy 0.003 0.063 0.059 0.104 0.027 0.058 0.088 0.005 0.010* 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.016 
 (0.015) (0.059) (0.059) (0.105) (0.074) (0.067) (0.143) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) 
         [0.004]      
WESTERN dummy -0.011 -0.030 -0.030 -0.103 -0.009 -0.054 0.004 -0.002 -0.012 -0.012 -0.019 -0.010 -0.014 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.077) (0.077) (0.145) (0.094) (0.088) (0.175) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Inflection point 27.47% N/A N/A 25.64% N/A 23.26% N/A 24.24% N/A N/A 25.56% N/A 23.45% N/A 
Observations 6315 6315 6315 2281 3941 4275 2040 6315 6315 6315 2281 3941 4275 2040 
Proportion > 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 37.99% 37.99% 42.04% 35.70% 42.74% 28.04% 
Log-likelihood N/A -1732.07 -1732.87 -650.08 -1025.60 -1392.87 -280.44 N/A -226.08 -1732.87 26.60 461.2 1153.05 1654.23 
Wald  χ2 (P value) N/A 3081.27 3082.52 1108.77 1879.83 2013.49 806.80 N/A 8452.33 3082.52 3891.71 4577.62 5888.92 2576.07 
 N/A (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) N/A (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sagan test  (p values) 59.30(0.173)        40.95(0.429)       
AR1 (p values) -9.55(0.000)       -5.73(0.000)       
AR2 (p values) 0.71(0.477)       0.77(0.442)       
               
 
Notes: In columns 1 to 7, the dependent variable (EXPDUM) is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm exports, and 0 otherwise. In columns 8 to 14, the dependent variable 
(EXPINT) is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not export, and takes the value of the actual exports to total sales ratio, otherwise. Estimates in columns 1 and 8 are 
obtained using a system GMM estimator; those in columns 2 and 9, using a piecewise specification; those in columns 3 to 7, using a random-effects probit estimator; and those in columns 10 to 
14, using a random-effects tobit estimator. In the random-effects probit and tobit models, the Wald statistic is aimed at testing the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are jointly equal 
to zero. For the system GMM regressions reported in columns 1 and 8, AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side 
variables except firm age as potentially endogenous variables: levels of these variables dated t-2 and further are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-differences of 
these same variables lagged once are used as additional instruments in the level equations. In columns 4/5 and 11/12, a firm is defined as state-owned if the state is identified as its ultimate 
owner. In columns 2-7 and 9-14, marginal effects are in square brackets for those coefficients that are statistically significant. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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Table A1.  Variables’ names, definitions, and expected signs.  
 
Variables  Name Definition Expected sign 
Dependent variables    
Export propensity EXPDUM Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports, and 0 
otherwise 
 
Export intensity 
 
EXPINT Ratio of exports to total sales 
 
 
Corporate governance 
variables 
  
 
Managerial shareholding DOS Percentage of shares owned by managers, directors and 
supervisors 
+ (H1) 
 DOS2 Square of DOS - (H1) 
 DOS- 
dummy 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if DOS>0, and 0 otherwise 
 
  
DOS025 
 
Variable equal to DOS if DOS<0.25, and equal to 0.25 if 
DOS0.25 
 
 DOS25 
 
Variable equal to DOS-0.25 if DOS>0.25, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
State shareholding 
 
SOS 
 
Percentage of shares owned by the central government, 
local governments, or any entity representing the central 
or local governments.  
- (H2) 
Legal person shareholding LPS Percentage of shares owned by non-individual legal 
entities or institutions 
? 
Foreign shareholding FOWNS Percentage of shares owned by foreign investors + (H3) 
 FOWNS- 
dummy 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if FOWNS>0, and 0 
otherwise 
 
 
Board size 
 
BODSIZE 
 
Total number of directors on the board of directors 
 
- (H4) 
Independent directors INDIR Proportion of independent directors on the board of 
directors. 
-/no (H5) 
 
Control variables 
  
 
Firm size  SIZE Logarithm of the firm’s total real sales + 
Firm age AGE Logarithm of the number of years since the establishment 
of the firm 
+ 
Labor productivity  PROD Ratio of real sales to the number of employees + 
Capital intensity CIR Ratio of real fixed assets to the number of employees + 
Market- to-book  ratio MBR Ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the 
book value of debt to the book value of total assets 
+ 
Leverage ratio LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets - 
Liquidity ratio LIQTY Ratio of the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities to total assets  
+ 
Regional dummies REGION Dummies indicating whether the firm is located in the 
Coastal, Western, or Central region of China 
 
Year dummies YEAR Year dummies for the years 2005 to 2010.  
Industry dummies INDTRY Dummies for the following four industrial groups based 
on the CSMAR B classification: Properties, 
Conglomerates, Industry, Commerce. Utilities and 
financial industries are excluded. 
 
 
Note: Real variables are derived from nominal ones using China’s GDP deflator.  
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Notes 
                                                        
1
 Firms have endeavored in outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) via acquisitions or greenfield 
investment only very recently, as these forms of internationalization require a considerably greater resource 
commitment and risk taking than exporting (Morck et al., 2008). For instance, although China is the world’s 
largest exporter, its OFDI is still tiny and a limited number of firms are involved in it (Morck et al., 2008). 
2
 See Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for a detailed review. 
3
 Several papers have shown that corporate risk-taking is generally positively related to performance, thereby 
enhancing shareholder value (see, for instance, John et al., 2008). Looking specifically at the decision to 
enter export markets, which can be seen as a risky investment (Verhoeven, 1988), there is a huge literature 
which has shown that exporting is positively linked to corporate performance in general and productivity in 
particular (see, for instance, Park et al., 2010). 
4
 By contrast, Lin et al. (1988) argue that, although the reforms initiated by the government have increased 
managerial autonomy and intensified competition, due to policy burdens and soft budget constraints, instead 
of enhancing economic efficiency, they have worsened agency problems in SOEs.  
5 
Research focused on Chinese listed firms reaches similar conclusions using managerial tournament theory 
(Chen et al., 2011; Kato and Long, 2011). Specifically, these studies provide evidence suggesting that the 
winner’s price (executive pay) and the pay gap between the highest executive positions (i.e. the first- and 
second-tier executives) improve firm performance due to enhanced managerial efforts, but that the 
performance effects of managerial incentives derived from these corporate tournaments is weakened by state 
ownership and control (Chen et al., 2011; Kato and Long, 2011).  
6
 Although these changes were gradual and evolutionary compared with those experienced in other transition 
countries, Walder (2011, p. 23) refers to this as a Chinese version of “managerial revolution”. It should be 
noted, however, that the rise in managerial ownership has been slower in China compared to market 
economies (Walder, 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Conyon and He, 2012). 
7 
The latter figure is based on the data used in our empirical analysis. 
8
 This effect is likely to be more significant for Chinese managers than for their counterparts in Western 
countries, since their personal wealth is much lower (Walder, 2011). 
9 Even though ownership concentration is high in China, there often exists a separation between ownership 
and control. This can be explained by the dominance of pyramidal ownership structures among Chinese 
listed companies. Agency problems in China can also take the form of tunneling, whereby the listed 
companies transfer resources through related-party transactions to benefit the controlling shareholders at the 
cost of smaller investors (Jiang et al., 2010).  
10
 Bankruptcy risks are associated with possible non-payment, late payment, or fraud by foreign buyers. 
These risks may stem from the difficulty in verifying buyers’ creditworthiness and reputation when buyers 
reside in distant countries. They could also derive from buyers’ poor financial conditions, insolvency, or 
bankruptcy, and/or from their unwillingness to keep their contractual payment obligations. Firms who start 
exporting also face several challenges in terms of language, legal threats, conforming to foreign regulations, 
and cultural differences. In addition, there are risks in terms of legal security, reliability of trade partners, and 
exchange rates (Verhoeven, 1988). Transportation risks, which involve the risks of transferring goods from 
one country to another, also need to be taken into account. They may include theft and/or damage of goods 
during transportation. Finally, there may be risks caused by natural catastrophes, coup d'état, terrorism, civil 
war, revolution, insurrection and so on, in the buyer’s country. 
11 This happens because managers at SOEs are generally not rewarded on the basis of performance. 
12
 It should be noted, however, that, as discussed in Morck et al. (2008), a few large SOEs with lucrative 
state-enforced monopolies in natural resources or infrastructure sectors are actively involved in overseas 
mergers and acquisitions and outward foreign direct investment, seeking to acquire strategic resources. Yet, 
these types of companies are very few and the majority of SOEs are inefficiently run, highly unprofitable, 
and mainly engaged in domestic markets (Sun and Tong, 2003, Wei et al., 2005).  
13
 Specifically, legal persons may expropriate assets or cash flows from the listed firms, harming the interest 
of minority shareholders. 
14 By contrast, Peng (2004) argues that the introduction of independent directors in Chinese boards of 
directors has contributed to improving corporate governance. 
15
 All shareholding variables are calculated as the percentage of shares owned by various agents. For 
instance, following the finance literature (Anderson et al., 2000; Yuan et al., 2008), we define managerial 
shareholding (DOS) as the percentage of shares owned by managers, directors, and supervisors (including 
members of the supervisory board). It is noteworthy that most of the studies based on U.S. data also 
investigate the effects of high powered incentives such as holding of common stocks and options on 
investment decisions. Given that in China stock options are still an underdeveloped incentive mechanism for 
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managers, we consider stock holdings and non-stock options as the main incentive mechanisms for 
managers. 
16
 Following Yuan et al. (2008), foreign ownership includes non-tradable foreign-founder shares, tradable B-
shares, and tradable H-shares. 
17 We also estimated alternative specifications, which included the squares of state, legal person, and foreign 
ownership, but these terms were never statistically significant. The results are not reported for brevity, but 
available upon request. 
18
 We separately purchased export data by listed firms from GCCET LTD. The data file includes export 
value as well export sales ratios for all exporting firms. We then merged these export data with our main 
CSMAR database, which contains governance and other firm characteristics. 
19
 It should be noted that although firm size is measured as the logarithm of total real sales in the regression 
analysis, the figures reported in the descriptive statistics Tables are not in logarithms as actual values are 
easier to interpret. 
20
 There is, however, one exception: we observe in fact a high correlation between managerial ownership and 
its square (0.86). For this reason, following Kennedy (2008), we calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF), 
which is a standard test for multicollinearity. We note that the VIF does not exceed the threshold of 10, 
which suggests that the observed high correlation coefficient between managerial shareholding and its square 
should not cause problems in our regressions. 
21
 This can be explained considering that several exporters in China are engaged in processing trade: they 
import parts and input labor to assemble final products, which they then export (Dai et al., 2014). These 
exporters are therefore not necessarily more productive than non-exporters. In addition, according to the 
trade theory of comparative advantage, labor-intensive firms in China are more likely to become exporters 
(Lu et al., 2009). This explains why average capital intensity appears to be higher for non-exporters. 
22 The turning points are calculated setting the first derivative of Equation (1) with respect to DOS equal to 
0, and solving for DOS. 
23 The insignificant coefficients on foreign ownership that we found in most of our specifications can be 
explained considering that foreign ownership is very small in our sample of Chinese listed companies (see 
Table 1). This suggests that foreign ownership is not very common among listed Chinese companies, which 
could explain why it does not significantly affect firms’ decisions to enter export markets. The fact that other 
papers which also focused on China (e.g. Yi and Wang, 2012; Yi, 2014) found opposite results could be due 
to the fact that they estimated specifications much more parsimonious than ours. The positive coefficients 
they found on foreign ownership may therefore simply reflect an omitted variable bias. 
24
 It should be noted, however, that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable should be interpreted 
with caution as it is likely to be biased due to the correlation between lagged export propensity and the firm-
specific component of the error term.   
25
 See footnote 21 for an explanation for these findings. 
26 All our results were robust to replacing the market-to-book-ratio with sales growth as an alternative 
measure for the firm’s investment opportunities. 
27
 As in Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), we have also estimated regressions using two break points (at 5% 
and 25 % respectively) and found a positive relationship between managerial ownership and exporting within 
the range of 0-25% and a negative relationship thereafter. This finding is consistent with the descriptive 
statistics presented in Table 4. We have also undertaken an additional robustness test replacing managerial 
ownership and its square with dummies for managerial ownership less than 5%; between 5% and 10%; 
between 10% and 20%; between 20% and 30%; and higher than 30%. We found that that increasing 
managerial ownership from 0% to 10% enhances both export propensity and intensity. Yet increasing 
managerial ownership more has no effect on both dimensions of exporting, up to a threshold of around 30%, 
after which further increases in managerial ownership are detrimental to export propensity and intensity. 
These results are not reported for brevity, but available upon request. 
28
 The results for export intensity were also robust to estimating a system-GMM model augmented with the 
inverse Mills ratio on the subsample of exporters (see Minetti and Zhu, 2011, for a similar approach). These 
results are not reported for brevity, but available upon request. 
29
 It should also be noted that managerial ownership in state-controlled firms is very low: According to our 
data, it is in fact equal to 0.22% for state-controlled firms, and to 8.1% for privately-controlled firms. 
30
 In line with this argument, Todo et al. (2012) show that privatized Chinese companies are more likely to 
engage in exports than SOEs. 
31 It should be noted that the year 2006 is actually included in the pre-2006 period. 
 
 
